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Eyes are on us, but nobody cares: are eye cues relevant for strong
reciprocity?
Abstract
Strong reciprocity is characterized by the willingness to altruistically reward cooperative acts and to
altruistically punish norm-violating, defecting behaviours. Recent evidence suggests that subtle
reputation cues, such as eyes staring at subjects during their choices, may enhance prosocial behaviour.
Thus, in principle, strong reciprocity could also be affected by eye cues. We investigate the impact of
eye cues on trustees' altruistic behaviour in a trust game and find zero effect. Neither the subjects who
are classified as prosocial nor the subjects who are classified as selfish respond to these cues. In sharp
contrast to the irrelevance of subtle reputation cues for strong reciprocity, we find a large effect of
explicit, pecuniary reputation incentives on the trustees' prosociality. Trustees who can acquire a good
reputation that benefits them in future interactions honour trust much more than trustees who cannot
build a good reputation. These results cast doubt on hypotheses suggesting that strong reciprocity is
easily malleable by implicit reputation cues not backed by explicit reputation incentives. 
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Strong reciprocity is characterized by the willingness to altruistically reward co-operative 14 
acts and to altruistically punish norm-violating, defecting behaviours. Recent evidence 15 
suggests that subtle reputation cues, such as eyes staring at subjects during their choices, 16 
may enhance prosocial behaviour. Thus, in principle, strong reciprocity could also be 17 
affected by eye cues. We investigate the impact of eye cues on trustees’ altruistic 18 
behaviour in a trust game and find zero effect. Neither the subjects who are classified as 19 
prosocial nor the subjects who are classified as selfish respond to these cues. In sharp 20 
contrast to the irrelevance of subtle reputation cues for strong reciprocity, we find a large 21 
effect of explicit, pecuniary reputation incentives on the trustees’ prosociality. Trustees 22 
who can acquire a good reputation that benefits them in future interactions honour trust 23 
much more than trustees who cannot build a good reputation. These results cast doubt on 24 
hypotheses suggesting that strong reciprocity is easily malleable by implicit reputation 25 
cues not backed by explicit reputation incentives.  26 
 27 
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1. Introduction 37 
Human altruism represents a huge outlier in the animal world (Boyd and Richerson, 38 
2005). Humans often behave altruistically towards genetically unrelated strangers, even if 39 
the chance of meeting these strangers again is extremely small and reputational concerns 40 
are unlikely to play a role (for example, tipping an unknown taxi driver in a large foreign 41 
city). Altruistic behaviours in the absence of any opportunity of repeated interaction and 42 
reputation formation have been repeatedly shown in tightly controlled economic 43 
experiments (Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003). 44 
Experimental evidence (Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter, 2002), social preference theories 45 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr and Schmidt, 46 
1999; Rabin, 1993) and evolutionary theories (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Boyd et al., 47 
2003; Gintis, 2000; Henrich and Boyd, 2001) also indicate that a special type of altruistic 48 
behaviour – strong reciprocity – plays a particularly important role in establishing and 49 
sustaining co-operation among strangers. Strong reciprocity is characterized by the 50 
willingness to altruistically reward co-operative acts and to altruistically punish norm-51 
violating, defecting behaviours. As a consequence, strong reciprocity generates important 52 
incentives for cooperation among strangers. 53 
The fact that important altruistic behaviours exist even in the absence of 54 
reputation incentives does not mean that such incentives are irrelevant. A large literature 55 
shows that human co-operation and other forms of prosocial behaviour are positively 56 
affected by the possibility of acquiring a “good” reputation that may pay off in future 57 
interactions (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004; Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Fehr, 58 
Brown and Zehnder, 2009; Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Kurzban, DeScioli and O'Brien, 59 
2007; Milinski et al., 2001; Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck, 2002; Rege and Telle, 60 
2004; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000). However, recent 61 
articles seem to suggest that much of human altruistic behaviour may merely be a 62 
response to subtle reputation cues that are not in fact related to the possibility of 63 
benefitting in future interactions from current altruistic acts (Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 64 
2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007; Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; Haley and Fessler, 65 
2005; Rigdon et al., 2009). Haley and Fessler argue that reputation incentives in the 66 
ancestral evolutionary environment thoroughly moulded human social interactions 67 
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because “natural selection can be expected to have shaped human psychology to be 68 
exquisitely sensitive to cues that are (or were, under ancestral conditions) informative 69 
with respect to the likely profitability of co-operation in a given situation” (Haley and 70 
Fessler 2005, p. 249). These authors thus implemented a visual cue in an anonymous 71 
experimental game – eyes staring at the subjects during decision-making – a cue “that, 72 
over the course of human evolution, would have reliably indicated the potential 73 
observability of one’s behaviour” (p. 249). Haley and Fessler (2005), Burnham and Hare 74 
(2007), Bateson et al. (2006) and Rigdon et al. (2009) indeed found that eyes staring at 75 
the subjects cause an increase in prosocial behaviours in anonymous games such as the 76 
dictator game.  77 
In this paper we examine whether a reputation cue like that implemented in Haley 78 
and Fessler (2005) also affects strong reciprocity by implementing an anonymous, one-79 
shot, trust game in which a trustor can send money to a trustee; the experimenter then 80 
quadruples this amount, so that the trustee receives four times the amount sent. The 81 
trustee observes how much the trustor has sent and can then send back as little or as much 82 
money as he wants. Thus, the trustee can altruistically reward trustors who have sent 83 
money which constitutes an instance of strong reciprocity. By comparing the eye cue 84 
condition with a baseline condition without such cues we can assess the impact of eye 85 
cues on strong reciprocity. 86 
In addition to the eye cue condition we implement another reputation condition in 87 
which subjects face a real pecuniary incentive for acquiring a good reputation. Previous 88 
work has argued that eye cues activate reputational concerns, but did not explicitly 89 
compare the effect of eye cues with the effect of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. 90 
If humans are indeed “exquisitely sensitive” to reputational cues even if they carry no 91 
real pecuniary incentive power, subjects should generate patterns in the eye cue condition 92 
that resemble the effects of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. Our design enables 93 
us to conduct this comparison and investigate the relative importance of reputational cues 94 
for altruistic behaviour.  95 
We also go beyond previous work by examining which – if any – subjects 96 
respond to the implicit reputation cue because we measure subjects’ degree of selfishness 97 
and opportunism with a Machiavellianism questionnaire (Christie and Geis, 1970). 98 
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Assessing individual differences in subjects’ responses to reputation cues is important 99 
because on average one might find a null effect which hides important inter-individual 100 
differences. Implicit reputation cues could increase the altruistic behaviour of prosocial 101 
subjects (i.e., those who score low on the Machiavellianism (Mach) scale). This has 102 
important consequences for the interpretation of altruistic behaviours in anonymous one-103 
shot experiments. If prosocial subjects primarily respond to the implicit reputation cue, it 104 
is possible to argue that they are most prone to all kinds of other subtle reputation cues 105 
that are often not controlled for by the experimenter in the typical laboratory experiment 106 
(for example, the mere presence of other subjects and the experimenter in the room or 107 
simply hearing human voices). It would then be more plausible to attribute the baseline 108 
altruism observed in anonymous one-shot experiments to such uncontrolled reputation 109 
cues. However, if prosocial subjects do not respond to the eye cues, it is hard to argue 110 
along these lines. It is then implausible to attribute the observed altruistic behaviours in 111 
anonymous one-shot experiments to uncontrolled subtle reputation cues. Thus, by 112 
measuring subjects’ Mach score we can put important constraints on the interpretation of 113 
altruistic behaviours in anonymous one-shot experiments. 114 
 115 
 116 
2. The Experiment 117 
 118 
2.1. Experimental procedure 119 
We measured strong reciprocity as second-mover behaviour in a series of one-shot trust 120 
gamesA trustor and a trustee interact with each other in a trust game; the trustor can send 121 
money to the trustee which is then multiplied by the experimenter so that the overall 122 
money available to the two parties increases. The trustee can then send back none or 123 
some of the money to the trustor. Fairness norms typically demand that the trustee send 124 
back some of the money he received, but the trustee is completely free to send back 125 
nothing if he likes. Details of the trust game are described in Section 2.2 below.  126 
Our experimental design includes three treatments: a baseline treatment where the 127 
trustee faces a neutral background screen (see Figure 1a); an “implicit reputation cue” 128 
treatment where the background screen features eyespot-like shapes similar to those in 129 
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Haley and Fessler (see Figure 1b); and an “explicit reputation” treatment where the 130 
current trustor is informed of the trustee’s decisions in the previous periods (same 131 
background screen as in the baseline treatment).  132 
Subjects were seated in isolated compartments and were assigned either to the role 133 
of a trustor or a trustee. They maintained their roles throughout the experiment. They then 134 
played 10 periods of the trust game, with randomly re-matched partners each period.  135 
We conducted 8 sessions (3 sessions each in baseline and implicit, 2 in explicit 136 
treatment), each session involving 36 participants, 288 participants in total (144 trustors 137 
and 144 trustees). The decisions in a group of subjects who interact with each other over 138 
the 10 periods are statistically not independent. In order to establish statistically 139 
independent observations, we created 3 matching groups per session, each consisting of 140 
12 subjects. Only the subjects within a matching group were matched with each other 141 
during the experiment, generating 3 independent observations per session. With three 142 
matching groups per session, we have 9 independent observations both in the baseline 143 
treatment and the implicit cues treatment and 6 independent observations in the explicit 144 
reputation treatment. 145 
Immediately after the end of the last period, the participants had to fill out a 146 
questionnaire (emotional state, fairness attitudes, Machiavellianism, trust, socioeconomic 147 
data). After completion, participants were paid a show up fee of CHF 10 plus their 148 
earnings from the experiment, at the rate of 1 point=CHF0.2. In total, a session lasted 149 
approximately 2 hours and subjects earned on average CHF48.88 ($41.77).  150 
 151 
 [Figure 1]  152 
 153 
2.2. Game Design 154 
Each period of the experiment was a one-shot trust game. At the beginning of each period 155 
trustors and trustees were endowed with 10 points. The game itself consisted of two 156 
stages: an investment stage where trustors had to decide how many points they would 157 
transfer to their current trustee, and a back-transfer stage where trustees had to decide 158 
how much they wanted to back-transfer to the trustor. The amount trustors invested was 159 
quadrupled and transferred to the trustee. Trustors could choose between 4 possible 160 
transfers: 1 point, 4 points, 7 points or 10 points. Trustees had three options: they could 161 
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back-transfer either nothing, or the amount the trustor sent (henceforth “compensate”), or 162 
they could back-transfer an amount that equalized the period payoff between trustor and 163 
trustee (henceforth “equalize”). When the trustee determined the back-transfer he was 164 
perfectly informed about the trustor’s choice and thus did not have to form beliefs about 165 
the size of the investment.  166 
In Table 1 we show the payoff matrix that corresponds to our trust game. The first 167 
number in each cell of the matrix represents the trustor’s payoff, the second number 168 
denotes the trustee’s payoff. The matrix shows that for any given investment level, the 169 
trustee is always best off in terms of monetary payoff by back-transferring nothing. This 170 
means that positive back-transfers (i.e., the choices “compensate” and “equalize”) can be 171 
regarded as altruistic acts because the trustee gives up some of his own payoff to increase 172 
the trustor’s payoff.  173 
 174 
[Table 1] 175 
 176 
 177 
2.3. Personality Questionnaires and Fairness Norms 178 
As the response to the different treatments may be heterogeneous depending on subjects’ 179 
degree of selfishness, we also measured subjects' Mach Score. For this purpose we used 180 
the MACH-IV Machiavellianism Questionnaire (Christie and Geis, 1970) which provides 181 
a measure of selfishness and opportunism. Recent results from a neuroeconomic study 182 
(Spitzer et al., 2007) indicate that Machiavellian subjects are much less willing to share 183 
money in a dictator game, and respond much more strongly to pecuniary punishment 184 
threats for norm violations. Moreover, subjects’ Machiavellianism also correlated 185 
strongly with activation in lateral orbitofrontal cortex that is known to be reliably 186 
activated when subjects face punishing stimuli. Thus, behavioural and neurophysiological 187 
evidence suggests that subjects’ Machiavellianism may affect their response to our 188 
treatment conditions.  189 
We also measured subjects’ fairness standards by asking them the following 190 
question. “Suppose that participant A [i.e., the trustor] transferred 10 points to participant 191 
B [i.e., the trustee]. B then chose 'compensate'. How fairly do you judge this behaviour?" 192 
(Additions in brackets did not appear in the questionnaire) Subjects indicated their 193 
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answer to this question on a Likert scale, coded from 1 (“very unfair”) to 7 (“very fair”). 194 
Note that subjects with high fairness standards perceive the choice as unfair and therefore 195 
assign a low score to this question while subjects with low fairness standards perceive the 196 
choice as fair and assign a high score.  197 
 198 
3. Hypotheses 199 
The implicit cues treatment measures the impact of implicit reputation cues on trustees’ 200 
altruistic behaviour in the trust game. The explicit reputation treatment enables us to 201 
assess the effect of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives on trustees’ behaviour. Thus, 202 
we can gain insight into the relative importance of the two kinds of reputation effects by 203 
comparing the effect of implicit cues with the effect of explicit reputation incentives.  204 
Consider the baseline and the implicit reputation treatment condition first. The 205 
game played in these two conditions constitutes a true one-shot game because the players 206 
remain fully anonymous and they meet a different anonymous partner in each period. 207 
Therefore, if both players are completely selfish and want to maximize their money 208 
earnings and the trustor knows this, the following outcome is predicted. The selfish 209 
trustee will always choose “nothing”, i.e., his back-transfer is zero, and the trustor will 210 
invest nothing because he knows that the trustee will back-transfer nothing in any case.  211 
However, there is a large literature indicating that a substantial share of 212 
experimental subjects is not completely selfish (see Fehr and Fischbacher 2003 for a 213 
review). This literature indicates that subjects may also have social motives such as 214 
inequity aversion (Dawes et al., 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or intention-based 215 
reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 216 
2004). Inequity averse trustees will choose the “equalize” option, while trustees who 217 
interpret high investments as particularly kind acts will make more generous back-218 
transfers in response to high investments. We summarize both these behaviours under the 219 
term “altruistic rewarding” because they imply a benefit for the trustor at the expense of 220 
the trustee and they reward the trustor's co-operative investment.  221 
A key question then is whether subjects’ social preferences are affected by 222 
implicit reputation cues such as eyespots. Recent evidence (Haley and Fessler, 2005; 223 
Bateson, Nettle and Roberts, 2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007) suggests that eye cues 224 
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affect prosocial behaviour in dictator games and public good games. In view of this 225 
literature, one would expect the trustees to respond to the eyespots in the implicit 226 
reputation treatment by making significantly higher back-transfers compared to the 227 
baseline treatment. 228 
As we are interested in the impact of the implicit reputation cue on the trustees’ 229 
social preferences, the fact that the trustee chooses his back-transfer with the exact 230 
knowledge of how much the trustor invested is important. This feature of our design 231 
ensures that unknown beliefs about the trustors’ investments do not affect the trustees' 232 
choices. In this aspect, our design differs substantially from the public goods experiments 233 
of Bateson et al. (2006) and Burnham and Hare (2007) because it is not clear why 234 
subjects change their contributions in response to a cue in a public goods experiment. In 235 
principle, the cue could cause a more optimistic belief about the other players' public 236 
good contributions which will then lead to an increase in the subject’s own contribution; 237 
it is known that many subjects are conditional co-operators (Fischbacher, Gächter and 238 
Fehr, 2001; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Kocher et al., 2008; Croson, 2007), i.e. they are 239 
willing to contribute more to the public good if they believe that other group members 240 
contribute more. Alternatively, the reputation cue could have a direct impact on subjects' 241 
social preferences, implying that subjects are willing to contribute more for any given 242 
belief level. If the first hypothesis holds, the reputation cue does not affect subjects’ social 243 
preferences; it “only” renders their beliefs about others more optimistic which then 244 
causes the change in behaviour. If the second hypothesis holds, the reputation cue has a 245 
direct effect on subjects’ social preferences. In our experimental design a change in the 246 
trustees’ behaviour cannot be attributed to changes in their beliefs because the trustees 247 
know the exact investment when they make their back-transfer. Thus, we can measure the 248 
impact of the implicit reputation cue for any given transfer level, which provides a clean 249 
behavioural measure of a change in social preferences.  250 
Because we measure subjects’ degree of Machiavellianism and their fairness 251 
standards, we are able to examine whether subjects who score differently on these 252 
measures respond differently in the different treatments. We expect, in particular, that 253 
highly Machiavellian subjects tend to back-transfer less in the baseline condition. It is 254 
also important to examine the impact of the implicit cue condition for subjects who score 255 
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high and low on the Mach score. In particular, if the non-selfish subjects (i.e. those 256 
scoring low on the Mach score) are particularly responsive to the implicit reputation cue, 257 
one may be more inclined to attribute the observed prosociality in anonymous one-shot 258 
experiments to uncontrolled implicit reputational features. In contrast, if subjects’ Mach 259 
scores do not affect the response to the implicit cue, one may have more confidence in 260 
the hypothesis that the prosocial behaviour in anonymous experiments is a true 261 
expression of subjects’ social preferences and not just an artefact of uncontrolled implicit 262 
reputation cues.  263 
In the explicit reputation treatment, the players’ personal identities are still kept 264 
anonymous but we render the history of the trustees’ back-transfers observable for their 265 
current trustors. Thus, each trustor can assess the past willingness of the current trustee to 266 
back-transfer resources. Because the trustees know this, even selfish trustees now have an 267 
incentive to choose “compensate” or “equalize” because in this way they can increase the 268 
likelihood that the trustors they face in the future (and know their past choices) will make 269 
large investments. This explicit reputation incentive ceases in the final period (when there 270 
will be no future encounters with trustors), i.e., the selfish trustees will defect in the last 271 
period, and only the trustees with social preferences will make positive back-transfers.  272 
The effectiveness of the explicit reputation incentive requires that the trustees 273 
understand that their current back-transfers will affect average investments of future 274 
trustors. Thus, the explicit reputation incentive will only raise the trustees’ back-transfers 275 
if the trustees exhibit this kind of rationality. Reputation incentives can also increase 276 
back-transfers of subjects with social preferences. They may, for example, choose 277 
“equalize” instead of only “compensate” when the pecuniary incentive coincides with 278 
their social motive. The hypothesis that explicit reputation incentives increase trustees’ 279 
transfers is also backed by previous findings (Gächter and Falk, 2002; Cochard, Van and 280 
Willinger, 2004). 281 
Our measure of Machiavellianism enables us to examine whether there is a 282 
meaningful heterogeneity in trustees’ responses to the explicit reputation incentive. In 283 
view of the behavioural and neurophysiological evidence documented in Spitzer et al. 284 
(2007), it seems plausible to conjecture that highly Machiavellian subjects respond more 285 
strongly to the explicit reputation incentive. Future trustors are likely to punish low back-286 
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transfers by lowering their investments. By definition, highly Machiavellian subjects are 287 
particularly susceptible to such threats. Therefore, they should respond more strongly to 288 
the pecuniary reputation incentives.  289 
 290 
4. Does the implicit reputation cue matter? 291 
In this section, we examine the impact of implicit reputational cues on trustees’ back-292 
transfers. If the implicit cue raises reputational concerns, the trustees in the implicit cue 293 
condition should make higher back-transfers than those in the baseline condition. 294 
Moreover, if the implicit cue has a sufficiently strong effect, the back-transfer pattern in 295 
the implicit cue condition should resemble the pattern in the explicit reputation condition. 296 
Finally, if the implicit reputational cue raises the trustees’ back-transfers, this may also 297 
increase the trustors’ investments because higher investments increase the trustors’ 298 
payoffs if a sufficiently high share of trustees chooses to equalize payoffs (see the final 299 
column in Table 1).   300 
Table 2 provides a first indication of the impact of the implicit cue condition. In 301 
the baseline condition, the average back-transfer is 6.28 points and the trustees’ modal 302 
choice is “nothing”. The average back-transfer in the implicit cue condition is even 303 
somewhat lower and the modal choice is also “nothing”. The small difference in the 304 
means across conditions is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.402, N=18). The 305 
trustors’ investment choices are also very similar across the two conditions. The median 306 
investment level in both conditions is 7, trustors in the baseline condition invest on 307 
average 5.88, while the average investment in the implicit cue condition is 5.74 (Mann-308 
Whitney test, p=0.825, N=18).  309 
Figure 2 shows the time path of average back-transfers. The figure indicates that 310 
the average back-transfer varies between 5 and 8 units in both the baseline and the 311 
implicit cue condition, with little difference between the conditions. The figure also 312 
displays the standard errors (clustered on matching groups) of the mean which indicate 313 
that the differences between baseline and implicit cue condition are not significant 314 
(Mann-Whitney test, p¥0.272, Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons). 315 
[Table 2] 316 
[Figure 2] 317 
 11
 318 
Thus, Table 2 and Figure 2 provide little indication that the implicit cue condition 319 
increased average back-transfers. An examination of the impact of implicit cues in more 320 
detail requires further control for the investments that the trustees face. Figure 3 shows 321 
the trustees’ average back-transfer conditional on the received investments. On average, 322 
trustees in the implicit cues condition sent back the same or a slightly smaller amount 323 
than in the baseline condition for any given investment level. In Table 3 we report the 324 
results of ordinary least squares regressions with the average relative back-transfer as the 325 
dependent variable. The relative back-transfer is defined as the share of points returned 326 
over the points received (i.e. the quadrupled investment). Thus, a choice of “nothing” 327 
implies a relative back-transfer of 0%, the choice of “compensate” translates into a 328 
relative back-transfer of 25%, and the choice of “equalize” means that 62.5% of the 329 
received points are sent back by the trustee. For example, with an investment level of 4, 330 
the trustee receives 4×4=16 points and sends back 10 if he chooses “equalize”, giving a 331 
payoff of 16 to each of the two players; the relative back-transfer equals 10/16=62.5%. 332 
Likewise, if the trustor sends 10 the trustee receives 40 and sends back 25 in case of 333 
“equalize” which yields a relative back-transfer of 25/40=62.5%. The advantage of using 334 
relative back-transfers is that a given choice, such as “equalize”, implies the same 335 
percentage number regardless of the investment level. Thus, our regressions implicitly 336 
estimate the conditional frequency of the three choices “nothing”, “compensate”, and 337 
“equalized”.  338 
 339 
 [Table 3] 340 
 341 
Column (1) in table 3 reports the result of a regression that takes the average relative 342 
back-transfer per matching group as the dependent variable. The independent variables in 343 
this regression are the average investment per matching group, dummy variables for the 344 
implicit cue and the explicit reputation treatment, the average Mach Score of the trustees 345 
in the matching group, and the average response to the fairness question (high answer 346 
indicates low fairness norm). In all regressions, the omitted category is the baseline 347 
dummy, implying that the constant measures the average relative back-transfer in the 348 
baseline condition while the dummy for the implicit cue (explicit reputation) condition 349 
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measures the difference between the baseline condition and the implicit cue (explicit 350 
reputation) condition. 351 
Regression (1) is the most conservative because the unit of observation is average 352 
behaviour in a matching group, giving us “only” 24 observations in total. We find a 353 
highly significant positive effect of the investment level, i.e. higher investments generate 354 
higher relative back-transfers. For our purposes, the most important result of regression 355 
(1) is the small and insignificant effect of the dummy for the implicit treatment. The 356 
coefficient for this dummy is close to zero, highly insignificant (p=0.533), and even has 357 
the “wrong” sign, indicating that eyespots have certainly no positive effect on trustees’ 358 
back-transfers. In addition, we find a significant (p=0.021) effect of the fairness standard 359 
in the baseline condition – subjects with a lower fairness standard tend to make lower 360 
back-transfers.  361 
In regression (2), we examine the mean relative back-transfer on the individual 362 
level. This yields 144 observations, as we have 36 trustees in the explicit reputation 363 
treatment (“explicit”) and 54 in each of the other two conditions (standard errors are 364 
clustered at the matching group level). In model (2) and (3), Mach score and Fairness 365 
represent dummies for subjects with an above-median Mach score and a below-median 366 
fairness standard; recall that subjects with a below-median fairness standard are those 367 
who give a high (above-median) rating on the fairness question. Interestingly, this has 368 
little effect on the impact of the investment level and implicit cue condition: we get 369 
virtually the same result as in model (1), both with respect to the size and the significance 370 
of these coefficients. In particular, the coefficient of the implicit cue treatment is still very 371 
small, insignificant (p=0.242), and has the wrong sign. However, because of the larger 372 
number of observations, the fairness standard and individuals’ Mach score is now almost 373 
significant at the 5% level (both p=0.056): subjects with lower fairness standards and a 374 
higher Mach score back-transfer less in the baseline condition. We are also able to 375 
examine the interaction between the fairness standard, the Mach score, and the implicit 376 
cue condition in regression (2). The interaction between the fairness standard and the 377 
implicit cue condition is clearly insignificant (p=0.998); the same holds for the Mach 378 
score (p=0.279). This indicates that the implicit cue condition also does not cause 379 
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behavioural changes in trustees with different fairness standards and different Mach 380 
scores.  381 
Finally, we take the decisions in each period as units of observation and cluster 382 
again on matching groups in model (3). The dependent variable is now the individual 383 
relative back-transfer in a period which limits the observations to 0%, 25%, or 62.5% of 384 
the received amount. In model (3), we also include variables that capture time effects. 385 
The results of model (3) are interesting in several respects. First, and most 386 
importantly, the coefficient for the implicit cue treatment remains small in magnitude and 387 
insignificant (p=0.304), and again has the wrong sign. Second, subjects who have a low 388 
fairness standard contribute less in the baseline condition (p=0.054). Third, subjects with 389 
a high Mach score also contribute less in the baseline condition (p=0.076). Both the 390 
second and the third effect are substantial, reducing the mean relative back-transfer 391 
between 8 and 11 percentage points. Fourth, the interaction between the implicit cue 392 
condition and the below-median fairness standard/above-median Mach dummy is not 393 
significant (p=0.921/p=0.319), indicating that individuals with a low fairness 394 
standard/high Mach score do not respond differently to the implicit reputation cue 395 
compared to individuals with a high fairness standard/low Mach score. Thus, there is no 396 
evidence that individuals who score low on selfishness and opportunism are more prone 397 
to implicit reputation cues. Both high and low Mach individuals show little response to 398 
the implicit reputation cue.  399 
 400 
5. The impact of explicit reputation 401 
In this section, we examine the effect of pecuniary reputation incentives on the trustees’ 402 
back-transfers and the trustors’ investments. Table 2 shows that – in contrast to the 403 
implicit reputation condition – the explicit reputation condition causes an enormous 404 
increase in average back-transfers – from 6.28 to 13.86. While the modal response in the 405 
baseline condition is “nothing”, the modal response in the explicit reputation condition is 406 
“equalize”. This big change in the trustees’ back-transfers is highly significant (Mann-407 
Whitney test, p=0.002) and led to a significant increase in the trustors’ investments – 408 
from 5.88 to 7.74 (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.006). In the explicit condition, the maximum 409 
investment also represents the median investment choice. This strong impact of pecuniary 410 
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reputation incentives can also be seen in Figure 2a. The average back-transfer is much 411 
higher in the explicit reputation condition in all but the last few periods. The time path of 412 
the average back-transfer in Figure 2a also indicates the relatively high degree of 413 
rationality that seems to be present in our experiment. During the early periods, a high 414 
back-transfer generates a good reputation for many remaining periods, implying that the 415 
pecuniary return of a good reputation is high. During the final few periods, a high back-416 
transfer generates a good reputation only for a few remaining periods, implying that the 417 
pecuniary return of a good reputation is lower. Thus, individuals who understand this 418 
should choose lower back-transfers during the final few periods because the selfish 419 
returns of behaving in this way are lower. The time pattern of back-transfers in Figure 2a 420 
is consistent with this rational choice argument.  421 
Interestingly, in period 10 of the explicit reputation condition – in which there are 422 
no pecuniary reputation incentives at all – the average level of back-transfers is very 423 
similar to the level in the other two conditions (in which explicit reputation incentives are 424 
absent by design). Thus, the trustees seem to understand the logic of pecuniary reputation 425 
incentives quite well: while they do not respond to merely implicit reputation cues that 426 
carry no explicit incentive power, they respond strongly to explicit reputation incentives, 427 
and they seem to understand when they can gain from a good reputation and when not.  428 
The powerful effect of pecuniary reputation incentives can also be seen in Figure 2b 429 
which controls for trustors’ investments: trustees’ back-transfer is higher at every 430 
investment level than in the other two conditions.   431 
Finally, the regressions in Table 3 provide further statistical support for the large 432 
effect of the explicit reputation condition. In models (1) and (2), the explicit reputation 433 
incentive increases the average relative back-transfer by 17.6 and 16.2 percentage points, 434 
respectively (p<0.001 and p=0.012). Note that in model (3) the inclusion of the “Explicit 435 
X Last3” interaction implies that the “explicit” variable captures the effect of the explicit 436 
reputation incentive for the first 7 periods while the variable “ExplicitXLast3” measures 437 
the decrease of back-transfers during the final three periods. The coefficient of 0.203 438 
(p<0.001) for the variable “explicit” thus indicates that in the first seven periods subjects 439 
increase the relative back-transfer relative to the baseline condition by 20.3 percentage 440 
points if they face an explicit reputation incentive. Moreover, highly opportunistic 441 
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trustees (above-median Mach score) show a 10.5 percentage points larger increase in 442 
relative back-transfers when they face an explicit incentive (coefficient of 0.105; 443 
p=0.044). Taken together, these results indicate a large effect of the explicit reputation 444 
incentive – an effect that contrasts sharply with the null effect of the implicit reputation 445 
cue. In fact, an F-test indicates that the difference between the coefficients of the implicit 446 
and the explicit condition is highly significant (p<0.001).  447 
The above results confirm the hypothesis that Machiavellian subjects respond 448 
particularly strongly to social punishment threats such as loss of reputation. This finding 449 
is consistent with the results of another study (Simpson and Willer, 2007) which also 450 
observes that egoistic subjects show a stronger response to pecuniary reputation 451 
incentives.  452 
 453 
6. Discussion  454 
There is little disagreement among researchers that explicit reputation incentives 455 
strongly affect human prosocial behaviour. These explicit incentives can take the form of 456 
higher future material benefits in a dynamic experimental game – such as in our explicit 457 
reputation treatment – or they can arise when real people (e.g. an audience) saliently 458 
observe other people’s cooperative or non-cooperative behaviour (Gächter and Fehr, 459 
1999; Rege and Telle, 2004; Kurzban, DeScioli and O’Brian, 2007; Smith et al., 2009). 460 
The strength of merely implicit reputation cues, in which subjects cannot really acquire a 461 
good or bad reputation is however, much less investigated.  462 
Therefore, we examined the impact of such cues on the strongly reciprocal 463 
behaviour of trustees in a trust game. Previous work has argued that eye cues activate 464 
reputational concerns, but did not explicitly compare the effect of eye cues with the effect 465 
of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. If reputational concerns shaped humans’ 466 
altruistic inclinations in ancestral environments to the extent suggested in some of the 467 
recent literature (Burnham and Hare, 2007; Haley and Fessler, 2005), that is, if humans 468 
are indeed so sensitive to reputational cues that they respond to them even if they carry in 469 
fact no real pecuniary incentive power, subjects should generate patterns in the eye cue 470 
condition that resemble the effects of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives. 471 
 16
However, our results indicate that eye cues, which have been hypothesized to 472 
represent reliable indicators of potential observability of one’s behaviour over the course 473 
of human evolution, have no effect at all on the trustees’ altruistic behaviour. The effect 474 
of the implicit cues treatment is close to zero, highly insignificant, and even has the 475 
wrong sign. Moreover, this null effect holds regardless of whether we examine the 476 
response of subjects who score high or low on the Mach scale. Our results therefore 477 
suggest an extremely cautious view of claims that most of the observed prosocial 478 
behaviour in anonymous one-shot games should be attributed to uncontrolled implicit 479 
reputation cues. At the current state of our knowledge, this claim represents no more than 480 
a speculation that lacks empirical support. If it were indeed the case that uncontrolled 481 
reputation cues are so important, behaviour should also respond to experimentally 482 
controlled implicit reputation cues.  483 
The null effect of the implicit reputation cue contrasts sharply with the large 484 
impact of explicit pecuniary reputation incentives on trustees’ behaviour. The large 485 
contrast between the implicit and the explicit reputation condition reinforces our 486 
conclusions above. The effect of the implicit cue does not even resemble the effect 487 
generated by the pecuniary reputation incentive, suggesting that implicit cues are a 488 
relatively weak force.  489 
We also found important individual differences in subjects’ response to the 490 
pecuniary reputation incentive. Subjects who score high on the Mach scale behave less 491 
altruistically in the baseline treatment, but they respond more strongly to the pecuniary 492 
reputation incentive.  493 
Why do other studies find an effect of eye cues on prosocial behaviour while we 494 
find none? With regard to the studies of Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006) and Burnham 495 
and Hare (2007) the following feature of their experiments might have caused the 496 
difference. Both experiments investigate contributions to a public good. As shown above, 497 
many people are conditional co-operators, and their contributions therefore depend on 498 
their beliefs about other people’s contributions. Eye cues could generate more optimistic 499 
beliefs about other subjects’ co-operation behaviour, which then induced higher co-500 
operation rates among subjects with preferences for conditional co-operation. This 501 
contrasts with our study in which we have full control over subjects’ beliefs because the 502 
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trustees know exactly the investment level if they make their back-transfer. Therefore, in 503 
our study eye cues cannot affects beliefs about other subjects’ behaviour. 504 
With regard to the Bateson et al. study – a field experiment about voluntary 505 
contributions to an honesty box in a university coffee room – another feature is also 506 
potentially important. Subjects often consume coffee jointly and observe whether their 507 
colleagues pay for the coffee. In this case subjects’ real and not just their imagined 508 
reputation is at stake. If eye cues draw attention to the moral appropriateness of paying 509 
for one’s coffee, then this real reputation incentive may be greatly strengthened. Thus, it 510 
is possible that the eye cues in the Bateson et al. experiment enhanced the already 511 
prevailing incentive to maintain one’s reputation as an honest coffee consumer. This 512 
feature of the Bateson et al. experiment also contrasts with our experiment because we 513 
rule out any interaction between the eye cue and the pecuniary (explicit) reputation 514 
incentive.  515 
Why did the eye cue affect the behaviour in the dictator game experiment of 516 
Haley and Fessler (2005) while lacking effect in our trust game? A possible reason for 517 
this may be that the dictator game constitutes a less robust situation. Experimental 518 
economists now generally acknowledge that the dictator game is likely to involve more 519 
experimenter demand effects (Bardsley, 2008) and is less robust than other games in 520 
which subjects interact with each other (Cooper and Kagel, 2010). Therefore, relatively 521 
weak forces can affect behaviour in the dictator game. Perhaps, the implicit reputation 522 
cue is one of these weak forces. 523 
 524 
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Figure Legends: 624 
 625 
Figure 1: Trustee decision screen. Upper panel: baseline background. Lower panel: 626 
eyespots background: 627 
 628 
Figure 2: Trustees’ mean back-transfers. Upper panel: over time across treatment 629 
conditions; error bars represent standard errors on matching group level (n=24). Lower 630 
panel: per investment level across treatment conditions 631 
632 
 22
Table Legends: 633 
 634 
Table 1. This table shows the monetary payoffs that are associated with each action 635 
combination. The first number in each cell denotes the trustor’s payoff while the second 636 
number denotes the trustee’s payoff. For example, if the trustor invests 7 points and the 637 
trustee “compensates”, the trustor earns 10 points and the trustee earns 31 points. 638 
 639 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of average, median and modal behaviour across 640 
treatments. 641 
 642 
Table 3: OLS Regression analysis of trustee decisions. P-values are given in 643 
parentheses; in models (2) and (3), we use Eicker-Huber-White sandwich estimators for 644 
the standard error, clustering on matching groups. 645 
Models (1) and (2) use aggregated data on the matching group and trustee level, 646 
respectively, i.e., the variables relative back-transfer and “Investment Level” are averages 647 
on the matching group and trustee level, respectively. “Mach” and “Fairness” represent 648 
matching group averages in model (1). 649 
Regressors: 650 
- “Investment level” is the number of points the trustor transfers. 651 
- “Implicit” and “Explicit” are dummies for the respective treatments (omitted 652 
category: baseline treatment). 653 
- In model (2) and (3), “Mach” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant 654 
scored above the median in the Mach-IV inventory. 655 
- In model (2) and (3), “Fairness” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant’s 656 
answer to the fairness question was above the median response (i.e., if the subject’s 657 
fairness standard is below the median).  658 
- “Explicit X Last3” is a dummy which equals 1 if the observation comes from periods 659 
8, 9 or 10 in the explicit treatment. Its purpose is to capture the end game effect that 660 
occurs when the future benefits from reputation vanish toward the end of the 661 
experiment. 662 
- “Period” denotes the experimental period and ranges from 1 to 10.   663 
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Figure 1 664 
  665 
 24
Figure 2 666 
 667 
  668 
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Table 1 669 
 670 
  Trustee 
  nothing compensate equalize 
Tr
us
to
r 1 point 9 14 10 13 11.5 11.5 
4 points 6 26 10 22 16 16 
7 points 3 38 10 31 20.5 20.5 
10 points 0 50 10 40 25 25 
 671 
 672 
Table 2 673 
 674 
 675 
Statistic Baseline Implicit Explicit 
Average Backtransfer 6.28 5.36 13.86 
Median Backtransfer compensate nothing equalize 
Mode Trustee Decision nothing nothing equalize 
Average Investment 5.88 5.74 7.73 
Median Investment 7 7 10 
Mode Investment 10 10 10 
Number Subjects 108 108 72 
Number Matching Groups 9 9 6 
 676 
 677 
Table 3 678 
 679 
 
dependent variable: 
 
(1) 
Mean relative back-
transfer at the level of 
the matching group 
(2) 
Mean relative back-
transfer at the level of 
the trustee
(3) 
Relative back-transfer in 
individual decisions 
(Mean of) Investment Level .031 (.001) .033 (.000) .018 (.000) 
Implicit -.013 (.533) -.040 (.242) -.038 (.304) 
Explicit .170 (.000) .107 (.012) .203 (.000)
(Mean of) Mach score .062 (.131) -.086 (.056) -.081 (.076) 
Mach X Implicit  .061 (.279) .057 (.319) 
Mach X Explicit  .110 (.033) .105 (.044) 
(Mean of) Fairness -.108 (.021) -.112 (.056) -.109 (.054) 
Fairness X Implicit  -.000 (.998) -.006 (.921) 
Fairness X Explicit  .007 (.919) -.018 (.774) 
Explicit X Last3   -.176 (.000) 
Period     -.006 (.001) 
Constant .049 (.347) .113 (.019) .230 (.000) 
N / # of variance clusters 24 / - 144 / 24 1440 / 24 
   
 680 
